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THE ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF MARRINER S. ECCLES 
L. Dwight Israelsen * 
Our depression was not brought about as a result of extravagance . . .. The 
difficulty is that we were not sufficiently extravagant as a nation. We did Mt 
consume what we were able to produce. . . . The theory of hard work and thrift 
as a means of pulling us out is unsound economically. True hard work means 
more production, but thrift and economy mean less consumptWn . . .. There is 
only one agency in my opinion that can turn the cycle upward and that is the 
Government. . .. The Government must so regulate, through its power of 
taxation, through its power over the control of money and credit, and hence its 
volume, the ecoMmic structure so as to give men who are able, and worthy and 
willing to work the opportunity to work and to guarantee to them sustenance for 
their families and protection against want and destitution. 
Marriner S. Eccles, 1932 
Yours was the only revolution on record that entered government by way of a 
central bank. 
John Kenneth Galbraith to Marriner S. Eccles, 1976 
I believe [Eccles] played a far greater role in the development of what came later 
to be called Keynesian policies than did Keynes or any of his disciples. 
Milton Friedman, 1983 
On July 29, 1983, the Federal Reserve Building in Washington, D.C. was 
formally named in honor of Marriner S. Eccles, the successful Utah banker and 
businessman who served as Governor of the Fed, 1934-36, as Chairman of the Board 
of Governors, 1936-48, and as a member of the Board, 1948-51. While Eccles was 
honored primarily for his struggle to maintain Federal Reserve independence to 
conduct monetary policy, his role in introducing "compensatory" monetary and fiscal 
policies--modern macroeconomic stabilization policies--was undoubtedly of equal or 
greater importance. In tracing the development of Eccles' macroeconomic philosophy, 
this study identifies him as one of the earliest American precursors to Keynes and 
as the most important figure in the introduction of "Keynesian" economic policies in 
the United States. 
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In February 1933, the Finance Committee of the United States heard 
testimony on the causes and cures' of the depression. While farmers argued for 
remonetization of silver as a means of recovery, and labor spokesmen suggested 
reduced hours and work weeks, the majority of the forty-six prominent Americans 
who testified were of the opinion that the depression represented the workings of 
natural economic law, a punishment for the "extravagance" of the Twenties, and that 
to interfere with the cycle of boom and bust was to invite disaster. "We should make 
one single and invariable dictum the theme of every discourse," said Bernard Baruch, 
summarizing the common view, "balance budgets, stop spending money we haven't 
got. Sacrifice for frugality and revenue. Cut government spending--cut it as rations 
are cut in a siege. Tax--tax everybody for everything. ,,1 
In this view, Baruch was reflecting the political wisdom of the day. While 
Congress had approved a major tax cut shortly after the crash of late 1929, the large 
federal budget deficits which accompanied the disastrous decline in national income 
had led to a reversal of tax policy, with both political parties in the 1932 campaign 
advocating a balanced federal budget as the key to economic recovery. The 
Democratic P~ty platform called for "a federal budget balanced on the basis of 
accurate executive estimates within revenues" and included a provision for reducing 
the size of government by 25 percent through massive cuts in expenditure programs. 
In an effort to reduce the deficit, Congress had passed in 1932 what was to that point 
the largest tax increase in U.S. history. Toward the end of the hearings, Marriner 
S. Eccles [who had been invited to participate by Senator William H. King as a favor 
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to a nephew who was a long-time friend of Eccles] was called to testify. Eccles, 43 
years old,. was a successful Utah banker and industrialist, a "conservative 
Republican II whose formal schooling had ended after three years of high school, but 
whose business acumen had enabled him to bring various interests through the worst 
years of the depression relatively unscathed. 
In his testimony, Eccles identified the cause of the depression as an 
insufficiency of effective demand, rather than punishment for past extravagances, loss 
of confidence, or workings of natural law, as those' before him had suggested. The 
cure, Eccles stated, was a restoration of sufficient spending to purchase the quantity 
of goods which it was possible to produce at full employment. Because the profit 
motive could be expected to lead individuals, business, and financial institutions to 
make'decisions which would further reduce spending, hence, income and employment, 
the government, motivated not by profits, but by the welfare of the public, must 
compensate by spending more. "I see no way of correcting this situation except 
through Government action," Eccles declared.2 He then proceeded to outline a 
five-point program of unemployment relief, public works, agricultural allotment, farm 
mortgage refinancing, and permanent settlement of interallied debts to deal with the 
immediate problems of the depression. He also proposed a plan for long-run economic 
stability that included unification of the banking system under the Federal Reserve 
and the creation of an agency to guarantee bank deposits; tax reform to achieve a 
more equitable distribution of wealth and purchasing power; passage of national child 
labor, minimum wage, unemployment insurance, and old age pension laws; federal 
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agencies to approve all new capital issues offered to the public and all foreign 
financing, all means of transportation, and all means of communication to insure 
their operation in the public interest; and a national planning board to coordinate 
public and private economic activities.3 Eccles' testimony was received by the 
Finance Committee with a mixture of interest, skepticism, disbelief, and outright 
hostility. Three years later, a cover story in Time Magazine evaluated his 1933 
proposals in the following terms: "Eccles laid before a Senate committee a plan, 
which turned out to be nothing less than a detailed blueprint of the New Deal. Only 
one Eccles suggestion has not materialized--official cancellation of War Debts.1t4 
The issue of primacy in intellectual or scientific discovery is often difficult or 
impossible to resolve. ' The development-of "Keynesian" thought on both sides of the 
Atlantic is a case in point. While Keynes did not publish his General Theory until 
1936, antecedent strands of what eventually became known as Keynesian theory can 
be traced back to the early 1930s and earlier. Eccles was only one of several who 
claimed to have developed the theory of compensatory finance independently as early 
as 1931. The purpose of this essay is not to answer definitively the question, "Who 
first had the idea?"--an impossible task, but rather to address another question, 
"Who, among the early proponents of compensatory economic stabilization was most 
responsible for the acceptance of 'Keynesian' analysis in the formulation of U.S. 
economic policy?" That the answer to the question is, most likely, "Marriner Eccles," 
is both the conclusion of the study and a testimony to the power of the ideas we now 
associate with Keynes. It is also testimony to the intellectual power and integrity of 
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Eccles, who, at the age of 41, determinedly followed his logic to unorthodox and 
unpopular conclusions, in spite of an upbringing, background, and profession which 
would seem to make him the most unlikely of revolutionaries. The discussion of 
Eccles' economic philosophy and his impact on U.S. economic policy which follows is 
based primarily on his papers, now on deposit in the Special Collections Library at 
the University of Utah, supplemented by published works dealing with Eccles and by 
correspondence and conversations with economists who associated with him during 
his public years and later. Information and opinions offered by Lauchlin Currie, 
Richard A. Musgrave, Evsey D. Domar, Charles P. Kindleberger, Herbert Stein, John 
Kenneth Galbraith, and Milton Friedman have been particularly valuable. 
I. Changing Views 
We must acknowledge that progress comes only through toil, economy, 
and thrift, and that these alone are the motive power which creates the 
enduring structure. 
Marriner S. Eccles, 1925 
The matter of economy is negative, the matter of spending is positive, and 
we have been doing the negative thing rather than the positive. We have 
been preaching the negative doctrine. . .. Our depression was not 
brought/about as a result of extravagance. . .. The difficulty is that we 
were not sufficiently extravagant as a nation. We did not consume what 
we were able to produce. . . . We are trying to apply a theory of economy 
as obsolete as the Ark. 
Marriner S. Eccles, 1932 
Marriner Eccles' father, David, was Utah's first native millionaire. Born in 
poverty in Glasgow, Scotland, in 1849, David had emigrated from Scotland with his 
family--blind father, mother, and seven children--in 1863, after their conversion to 
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Mormonism. The move from Scotland to Utah was a move from urban poverty to 
frontier poverty, but through hard work and unrelenting economy, David Eccles 
achieved the American dream. By the time he died in 1912, Eccles, who had been 
illiterate when he arrived in Utah at the age of fourteen and who was barely literate 
as an adult, had founded fifty-four separate enterprises. He owned real property in 
seven states and in Canada, and was president of seven banks and sixteen industrial 
corporations. He was an officer of forty-seven corporate enterprises, and his 
companies were among the leaders in the West in mining, manufacturing, refining, 
construction, agriculture, and finance. His estate was appraised at more than $7 
million.5 
Marriner Stoddard Eccles was the eldest of nine children born to David Eccles' 
second wife. Marriner's father, a polygamist, had twelve other children by his first 
wife. The success Marriner experienced in consolidating and expanding the 
fragmented holdings his family inherited on the death of his father has been 
well-documented elsewhere.6 In addition to property, Marriner Eccles inherited from 
his father a set of beliefs about the proper roles of individuals and government in the 
functioning ofJthe economic system. The invisible hand of laissez-faire capitalism 
would automatically combine resources in a way which would most efficiently 
increase production, wealth, consumption, and provide for a continually rising 
standard of living for all who participated. The role of government should be limited 
to "maintaining confidence" through strict budget-balancing at all times, while the 
greatest benefit would be received by those who worked hard, practiced strict 
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economy, and invested prudently. Confidence promoted saving, and saving financed 
new productive investment. If, by chance, a panic or depression disrupted the 
system, it was only a temporary, self-correcting adjustment which would disappear 
once the necessary bankruptcies and liquidations had occurred. Economic 
dislocations could be handled by private charity, and the West provided an ideal place 
for those dislocated to begin anew.7 "We must acknowledge," Eccles told Utah 
bankers in 1925, "that progress comes only through toil, economy, and thrift, and that 
these alone are the motive power which creates the enduring structure. ,,8 These 
beliefs, accepted without question by Marriner Eccles in prosperous times, stayed 
with him until early in 1931 when, by his own account: 
I saw for the first time that though I'd been active in the world of 
finance and production for seventeen years and knew its techniques, I 
knew less than nothing about its economic and social effects. The 
discovery of my ignorance, however, did not by itself lead anywhere. 
Friends whose estates I managed, my family, whose interests I 
represented, and the community at large, in whose economic life I 
played a sensitive role, all expected me to find a way out of the economic 
trap we were all in. Yet all I could find within myself was despair. 
Having been reared by my father to accept the responsibilities of wealth 
and having been placed by circumstances at the helm of many 
enterprises, there were times when I felt the whole depression was a 
personal affront. Wherein had I been at fault? Night after night 
following my headsplitting awakening, I would return home exhausted 
by the pretensions of knowledge I was forced to wear in a daytime 
masquerade. I would slump forward on a table and pray that the 
answers I was groping for would somehow be revealed. As an individual 
I felt myself helpless to do anything. 9 
Marriner Eccles had run aground on the shoals of macroeconomics. His 
discovery of ignorance was reflected in his public addresses. In a speech entitled, 
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"Banking as Related to Economic Conditions," delivered at a Bank Management 
Conference in Salt Lake City on March 26, 1931, Eccles said: 
Under conditions of prosperity little thought or attention is given to an 
analysis to determine factors creating prosperity or even normality .... 
The same thought and consideration should be given to an analysis of 
economic conditions in periods of prosperity as are given in periods of 
depression as it is necessary to avoid the mistakes of the former if we 
are going to prevent the distress of the latter. 
For nearly two years now the world has been going through a 
major economic readjustment of great intensity, creating suffering and 
hardship on the part of many millions of people. Everyone is interested 
in a solution and there has been a great deal of discussion allover the 
world as to the causes of the present depression and what the remedies 
may be. The solution assuredly is not an easy one and will not correct 
itself as some people like to believe .... The causes lie too deep and 
are too complex and wide-spread to be removed easily . . . . The modern 
system by which society supplies its wants is a complicated one. I t is 
a wonderfully effective organization when in balance with every branch, 
but if anything happens to throw it out of balance it is possible (to have 
millions of people unable to buy the products of others because they 
cannot sell their own. Something has happened, which has affected the 
buying power of millions of people, and other millions are trying to 
ignore it.10 
Eccles had by this ' point rejected the idea of the automatic restoration of 
economic prosperity through the workings of the invisible hand of narrow 
self-interest. He had discovered the fallacy of composition and had concluded that 
"intelligent and courageous" open-market purchases by the Fed could have averted 
the drastic deflation which followed the crash. He also found in the writings of 
William Trufant Foster, a leading economic heretic since the 1920s, a basic 
explanation of and suggested cure for the depression which squared with Eccles' own 
principal experiences and observations. Foster argued that the widely-held view that 
the depression was the result of extravagant spending in the Twenties was the exact 
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reverse of the truth. "Far from having been profligate, the nation wasted its 
substance in riotous saving, " he argued. U nderconsumption, rather than undersaving 
was the culprit, since industry stops making goods and hiring labor "solely because 
it cannot sell the goods." Foster also argued that the "lazy fairies" of private 
enterprise could not be expected to reverse the decline in purchasing power by 
producing or investing without expectation of sales or profits. Since, in Foster's view, 
an increase in consumer purchasing power was the only sound way to quickly end the 
depression, public enterprise was the only alternative. Foster concluded that the 
federal government should deliberately increase the national debt by spending for 
public works and by tax reductions in order to increase aggregate purchasing power 
and end "the depression.!! During the period 1931-33, Eccles developed and extended 
the underconsumption theory, buttressed it with an impressive array of statistics, 
and by 1933 had arrived at the essential framework of "Keynesian" analysis and 
policy. The evolution of his thinking can be identified in his public addresses of 1932 
and 1933. Speaking on the subject "Depression--Its Causes, Effects, and Suggested 
Remedies" before the Utah State Bankers Convention on June 17, 1932, Eccles 
declared: 
I believe, contrary to the opinion of most people, that the depression 
within our own country was primarily brought about by our capital 
accumulation getting out ofbalance and relationship to our consumption 
ability. . .. Our depression was not brought about as a result of 
extravagance. . .. We did not consume as a nation more than we 
produced . . . . The difficulty is that we were not sufficiently 
extravagant as a nation. We did not consume what we were able to 
produce . . . . In other words, we have lost sight of the fact that the end 
of production is consumption and not money. 
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Eccles mentioned the fallacy of composition problem and the futility and perversity 
of federal government efforts to balance the budget as a means to recovery: 
The matter of efficiency where it means the reduction of labor and 
laying off of men ... must defeat its own purpose, and we have been 
going on here for a period of more than three years, each attempting to 
solve his own problem by the process of laying people off, by the process 
of reduction of wages and salaries, and by the process of cutting every 
possible expenditure that it was possible to cut, and when we finally get 
through the process we find that we are just where we were when we 
began because everybody else is doing the same thing, without 
accomplishing our purpose, but merely reducing the standard of living, 
with a constant decrease in consumption . . .. N ow, I do not say that 
we can do anything else because as individuals, as corporations, we are 
forced to balance our budget. We have no power to regulate the 
question of credit or money and each one must scramble to protect 
himself until something is done to bring about a turn, but the 
disappointing thing in all of this is that the Government ... which is 
the one agency that has the power to regulate the value of 
money ... has now adopted a policy of deflation. 
They are advocating economy and discharging men and reducing 
the purchasing power. They are only following the same trend that all 
individuals and corporations have been forced to follow. We hear the 
necessity of balancing the budget. . .. It may be well for them to 
consider that the production of wealth is accomplished by mental and 
physical effort and that when people are unemployed or employed on 
part time you stop the production of wealth at the very source, and just 
to the extent that unemployment increases, just to that extent are you 
going to find it more impossible to pay debts and collect taxes, and to 
balance any budget--Government or any other budget. It seems to me 
that it would be well for us to recognize the fact that our national 
income today is approximately thirty billion dollars less than it was in 
1929, or a loss in national income of about two and one-half billion 
dollars a month. Due to what? Due to the loss of employment, due to 
the decrease in consumption, due to a lower standard of living. And yet 
we worry and we talk about the failure to balance the budget by a 
billion dollars, and at the same time we are losing through 
unemployment possibly two billion dollars a month. 
Alternative theories of the causes of depression were discussed and dismissed: 
When you look over this country ... and realize that possibly a third of 
our population do not have any of the modern facilities and 
conveniences--do not know what it is to use electricity, ... you will 
realize that we do not have over-production for our needs, but merely 
lack of buying power because of unemployment. 
N ow I do not say that a greater consumption and higher standard 
of living may make better people. If we are going to assume that we 
have got to have a chastisement and a punishment as a result of our 
extravagances, then I suppose we have got to go through these 
depressions, these devastations and destruction, this breaking down of 
morale every so often, but if we are going to be scientific and if men are 
going to be equal to the machine that they have created then we are 
going to recognize that as medical science has developed in the 
elimination of many virulent diseases, so can economics advance in the 
elimination of these disastrous, destructive, unnecessary depressions. 
These are not acts of God, they are mistakes of man, and I do not 
believe they are punishment meted out to us. 
Traditional theories of economic recovery were also discarded: 
The economic conceptions that affected the conditions in this country 
when we were a debtor nation, when we had frontiers to develop, do not 
in any way affect the situation today. The theory of hard work and 
thrift as a means of pulling us out is unsound economically. True hard 
work means more production, but thrift and economy mean less 
consumption. Now reconcile those two forces, will you? We do not want 
capital accumulation in the sense that we need to add to our plant 
facilities. We do not want credit. . .. People who want credit want to 
borrow it from you to pay somebody else. That's all. People are not 
going to use credit to put men to work until they get a demand for the 
thing they produce, and they are not going to get a demand for the thing 
they produce until you create employment, give buying power to the 
consumer. 
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"N ow for the solution of our problem," Eccles said. "How are you going to put 
these people back to work? There is only one agency in my opinion that can turn the 
cycle upward and that is the Government." 
If a man owed himself he could not be bankrupt, and neither can 
a nation. We have got all of the wealth and resources we ever had, and 
we do not have the sense, the financial and political leadership to know 
how to use them. We are trying to apply a theory of economy as 
obsolete as the Ark. 
If the Government in order to finance the war could spend billions 
of dollars in order to give protection to life and property, and not have 
one single" thing to show for it when it is over but the destruction of the 
flower of the youth of the nation, then certainly the Government is 
justified in supplying sufficient credit or money to take care of the 
unemployed through public works, or an unemployment wage or a 
combination of both ... the Government, if it is worthy of the support, 
the loyalty, and the patriotism of its citizens, must so regulate, through 
its power of taxation, through its power over the control of money and 
credit, and hence its volume, the economic structure so as to give men 
who are able, and worthy and willing to work, the opportunity to work 
and to guarantee to them sustenance for their families and protection 
against want and destitution.12 
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Eccles had further developed and refmed his ideas by 1933. His address to the 
Utah Education Association on October 27, entitled "Reconstructing Economic 
Thinking, II began with a statement of perspective on the development of his own 
thinkipg in the area of macroeconomics. Ifl do not profess to be an economist, If he 
began. liThe views which I here express are the result of personal observations and 
study made in the field of active business and financial life. It 
I think up until the time of the depression I was fully as orthodox 
in my economic and financial conceptions as any of the most 
conservative bankers and business leaders. This for the reason that I 
had been so absorbed by the fascination of the financial and business 
game that I had not stopped to consider the fundamental and 
underlying purpose of it all. I had not answered for myself the question, 
IIWhat is an economic system for?" With the development of the past 
four years I have been forced to greatly change most of my former 
conceptions which I had grown up with due to the numerous paradoxes 
which I have been confronted with on every hand.13 
Eccles then argued that changes in the world during the preceding 150 years 
had reduced or eliminated many of the forces which had led to spontaneous recovery 
from depressions in the past, a point he had made forcefully in his Senate Finance 
Committee testimony earlier that year: 
Our individual evolution has made necessary a new economic 
philosophy, a new business point of view and fundamental changes in 
our social system. The nineteenth century economics will no longer 
serve our purpose--an economic age 150 years old has come to an end. 
The orthodox capitalistic system of uncontrolled individualism, with its 
free competition, will no longer serve our purpose. We must think in 
terms of the scientific, technological, interdependent machine age, which 
can only survive and function with a modified ca~italistic system 
controlled and regulated from the top by government. 4 . 
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"In the past," he told Utah educators, "the usual way out of depressions has 
been through a revival of new investments by the expenditure of private capital." 
... Our orthodox economic thinkers assume that this will repeat 
itself and they advocate b~ing quiet and waiting, assuming that the 
financial processes will take us out of the depression, while at the same 
time our banks hold hundreds of millions of cash reserves sufficient to 
extend credit by eight to ten billion of dollars on a basis of our present 
gold reserve without requiring any change in the gold value of our 
dollar. With this capacity for almost ·unlimited credit expansion our 
financial institutions continue the contraction of credit and new 
investments are almost at the zero point . . . . 
The assumption of spontaneous revival through new investment 
has always rested on the fallacious belief that people and banks will not 
indefinitely hold money in idleness. This is a false idea, as this 
depression is beginning to prove. The question is not how bankers and 
those who have idle money and credit can bring about recovery, but why 
they should do so, so lo,?! as there is no incentive offered in any field for 
profitable investment.! 
The breakdown of the "invisible hand" in the macroeconomy was clearly stated 
to the Finance Committee: 
We see now, after nearly four years of depression, that private 
capital will not go into public works on self-liquidating projects except 
through government and that if we leave our "rugged individual" to 
follow his own interest under these conditions he does precisely the 
wrong thing. Each corporation for its own protection discharges men, 
reduces payrolls, curtails its orders for raw materials, postpones 
construction of new plants and pays off bank loans, adding to the 
surplus of unusable funds. Every single thing it does to reduce the flow 
of money makes the situation worse for business as a whole.!6 
15 
The banking system was,subject to the same problem: "Our banking system 
as a whole is not responsible for the depression any more than any other branch of 
our capitalistic economy of individualism . .. In times of depression, when prices 
break, banks are forced to contract credit as rapidly as possible in order to protect 
deposi tors. ,,17 
Eccles, however, rejected the idea that a shortage of currency in circulation was 
responsible for the continuation of the depression. "There is no shortage of currency 
in circulation at the present time," he said. The problem was "due to the amount of 
currency which is hoarded and the lack of velocity of existing currency . . . . The need 
is not for more money, but for more spending."lS 
If a shortage of currency did not cause the Depression, neither did a shortage 
of credit. Said Eccles: 
If it is credit we need, why do not, say, 200 of our great 
corporations controlling 40 per cent of our industrial output that are in 
such shape that they do not need credit--they have great amounts of 
surplus funds--if it is credit that is needed why do they not put men to 
work? Why do not those great institutions put men to work? For the 
very reason that there is not a demand for goods.19 
To the view that recovery was dependent on the establishment of "sound 
money," Eccles commented: 
It seems to me that sound money is merely money which 
maintains or increases in its purchasing power . Unsound money is 
money which continues to decline in its purchasing power. The 
goodness or the badness is the extent of the appreciation or depreciation 
after the money is issued. . .. The only security of any issue of money 
is a right course of future events measured by sufficient spending to 
maintain a price structure in relation to the value of money when it was 
created. Believers in sound money are deluded when they think they 
have ways of foretelling its future value. For the past two years or more 
we have had the painfully sound dollar measured by its purchasing 
power in terms of goods and services. The sounder it got the further 
prices fell and the more unemployment increased. Had the policy of 
economy and budget balancing on the part of the Government continued, 
it would have soon been so sound that all of our credit institutions 
would have been closed, there would have been no bank money and all 
of the people would have been starving to death with an abundance of 
everything for everybody, or at least the willingness and power to 
produce it .... 
Our sound money friends seem to be terrified lest the Government 
unbalance its budget and spend enough money to give the shivering and 
undernourished millions of unemployed unsound money in return for 
productive labor so that the great quantities of now unsaleable goods 
and unrentable housing might be bought and utilized. The sound money 
people say that the credit to build factories, which are now idle, and 
credit to foreign governments, which they can now only pay in goods, 
was sound a few years ago, but money created by Government fmancing 
and spent by it for relief, public works, housing, and slum clearance, 
would not now be sound because not self-liquidating and 
profit-yielding .... 
The great struggle in America today is between the people who 
believe in what they call sound money and the people who believe in the 
right to eat and the right to work. · 
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"There is no security for anyone except in a steady production, a balanced 
distribution, and a responsible humane government. There can be no security for the 
thrifty or the worker [in a state which] allows production to become paralyzed and 
millions of men to go without work. In such a state, sound money is not only a 
travesty but a tragedy," Eccles concluded.20 
By 1933, Eccles had concluded that only the government was in a position to 
stimulate economic recovery. "Financial fuel is piled up," he said, 
--the Government, and not the bankers, must apply the torch. Motives 
of public welfare must lead us out of the present depression as greed 
and war have led the world out of past depressions.... The 
Government, unlike the bankers, has the power of taxation and power 
to create money and does not have to depend on the profit motive.21 
"If my analysis is correct," said Eccles, 
we can not expect private investors to draw their money from the banks 
and put it into circulation through providing capital for new investment; 
neither can we expect those who have credit to use that credit for a 
similar purpose under present conditions. We must then depend upon 
the Government to save what we have of a price, profit and credit 
system. 
The only escape from a depression must be by increased spending. 
In the absence of new fields for investment in a world already glutted 
with unsaleable products, the only way to increase spending is for the 
Government to spend it for nonprofit-yielding works for the benefit of 
all, for the expansion of social services of all kinds, or for war . . . . War 
certainly is the worst way to provide the means for more spending .... 
It is unfortunate to have to kill people in order to spend enough to 
consume the goods necessary to keep people employed. 
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"This argument is not against consumption," Eccles emphasized, "but it is 
against the bad type of consumption which is constituted by war. ,,22 
In defen~ng government expenditures on public works before the Senate 
Finance Committee, Eccles also contrasted those expenditures with war expenditures 
in the following exchange. 
Senator Walsh of Massachusetts: "We can go to extremes of waste in the 
matter of public works if we are not very careful." 
Mr. Eccles: "Of course we are losing $2 billion per month in unemployment. 
J 
I can conceive of no greater waste than the waste of reducing our national income 
about half of what it was. I cannot conceive of any waste as great as that." 
Senator Walsh: "Your suggestion is that we meet it by borrowing large sums 
of money in performing works. That the people have got to pay for it in 
taxation, . . . . tI 
Mr. Eccles: 
No, they would not pay for it now. There are times to borrow and there 
are times to pay. The Government borrowed during the war $27 billion, 
and we got prosperity even though all they borrowed was wasted, every 
dollar of it. There could be no waste in post offices or in roads or in 
schools. You would have something to show for it. With war all you 
have left is the expense of taking care of maimed and crippled and sick 
veterans. That is what is left from war. And it is all wastage. 
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On balancing the government budget, Eccles had the following 
observations: "In the light of this record," he asked the Finance Committee, 
is it consistent for our political and financial leadership to demand at 
this time a balanced Budget by the inauguration of a general sales tax, 
further reducing the buying power of our people? 
Is it necessary to conserve Government credit to the point of 
providing a starvation existence for millions of our people in a land of 
superabundance? Is the universal demand for Government economy 
consistent at this time? Is the present lack of confidence due to an 
unbalanced budget? 
What the public and the businessmen of this country are 
interested in is a revival of employment and purchasing power. This 
would automatically restore confidence and increase profits to a point 
where the Budget would automatically be balanced in just the same 
manner as the individual corporation, State, and city budget would be 
balanced. 
Today we are losing close to two billions per month of national 
income due to unemployment, resulting in the inability of our people to 
purchase the goods necessary to sustain our production. Is there any 
program of economy and Budget balancing on the part of our 
Government as important as to stop this great loss and all the attendant 
human suffering, devastation, and destruction? 
With circumstances so serious, the failure of political and financial leaders to 
take corrective action was, in Eccles' mind, inexcusable. "The breakdown of our 
present economic system," he asserted, "is due to the failure of our political and 
financial leadership to intelligently deal with the money problem." Unless corrective 
measures were taken, Eccles predicted, "we can only expect to sink deeper in our 
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dilemma and distress, with possible revolution, with social disintegration, with the 
world in ruins, the network of its financial obligations in shreds, with the very basis 
of law and order shattered .... " "Why risk such a catastrophe," he asked, "when it 
can be averted by aggressive measures in the right direction on the part of the 
Government. ,,23 
"I t is a national disgrace," he told the Finance Committee, "that such suffering 
should be permitted in this, the wealthiest country in the world." 
The present condition is not the fault of the unemployed, but that 
of our business, financial, and political leadership. It is incompre-
hensible that the people of this country should very much longer 
stupidly continue to suffer the wastes, the bread lines, the suicides, and 
the despair, and be forced to die, steal, or accept a miserable pittance in 
the form of charity which they resent, and properly resent. We shall 
either adopt a plan which will meet this situation under capitalism, or 
a plan will be adopted for us which will operate without capitalism .... 
You have got to take care of the unemployed or you are going to have a 
revolution in this country.24 
II. Compensatory Economics 
Financial fuel is piled up--the Government, and not the bankers, must 
apply the torch. Motives of public welfare must lead us out of the present 
depression as greed and war have led the world out ofpast depressions. 
) Marriner S. Eccles, 1933 
I see nothing in our economic organization to lead me to believe that 
business stability will ever come about by itself. I think that without a 
fair measure of stability the system will not survive. I hope and I believe 
that the inherent instability of capitalism may be corrected by conscious 
and deliberate use of three compensatory instruments, taxation, varying 
governmental expenditures, and monetary control . . .. It should be 
evident by now that simple maxims and rules of thumb are not sufficient. 
Marriner S. Eccles, 1935 
The Government must be looked upon as a compensatory agency in this 
economy to do just the opposite of what private business and individuals 
do~ The latter are necessarily motivated by the desire for profit. The 
former must be motivated by social obligation. 
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Marriner S. Eccles, 1936 
By the mid-1930s, Eccles' compensatory policy recommendations were based 
on a sophisticated macroeconomic analysis which covered the consumption function; 
the multiplier; a distinction between the relative sizes of the government expenditure 
and transfer-tax multipliers; leakages and injections; causes of inflation; liquidity 
trap; velocity; the transmission mechanism of monetary influences; the Phillips curve; 
the relationships among increases in the money supply, productivity increases, and 
inflation; the role of inflationary and deflationary expectations; income and wealth 
distribution; the coordination of monetary, fiscal, and incomes policies; and the 
interrelationships between domestic stabilization policies and international 
movements of goods and capital. While he never attempted the construction of a 
formal model, all of the elements of "Keynesian" analysis, with the possible exception 
of the accelerator, may be found in his speeches, letters, and memos. 
All policies which came under Eccles' scrutiny were examined for stabilization 
implications. JAs an example, Eccles felt that Social Security taxation should be 
deliberately controlled in a counter-cyclical fashion, with increases in rates during 
booms and reductions during depressions. Taxation in general should be used mainly 
as a means of redistributing income from wealthy individuals and corporations to low 
and middle-class consumers who had, Eccles believed, higher marginal propensities 
to consume: 
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"The fundamental economic plans, when they are finally established," he said 
in 1933, "will of necessity center in the distribution of purchasing power and in the 
allocation of income between investment and expenditures .... " 
These plans will involve public and semi-public expenditure on an 
expanding scale for cultural and quasi-cultural services. They will 
involve relief of taxation that rests on the consumer; the reduction of 
sales taxes, of real estate taxes, of tariffs, and of public service charges. 
They will involve the establishment of heavy income taxes especially in 
upper brackets. They will involve heavy taxation of undistributed 
corporate surplus, to force corporation income into dividends and 
taxes.25 
A good summary statement by Eccles on compensatory policy was delivered in 
1935, when he declared his hope that "the inherent instability of capitalism may be 
corrected by conscious and deliberate use of three compensatory instruments, 
. . 
taxation, varying governmental expenditures, and monetary control .... It should 
be evident by now," he said, "that simple maxims and rules of thumb are not 
sufficient. ,,26 
III. The Future of Capitalism 
The present condition is not the fault of the unemployed, but that of our 
business, financial, and political leadership. It is incomprehensible that 
the people of this country should very much longer stupidly continue to 
suffer the wastes, the bread lines, the suicides, and the despair, and be 
forced to die, steal, or accept a miserable pittance in the form of 
charity . . .. We shall either adopt a plan which will meet this situation 
under capitalism, or a plan will be adopted for us which will operate 
without capitalism. . .. You have got to take care of the unemployed or 
you are going to have a revolution in this country." 
Marriner S. Eccles, 1933 
If [compensatory monetary and fiscal policy instruments] are not 
established or if they are not successful in achieving economic 
stability . .. you will not have compensatory but direct controls in every 
important sphere of economic activity. 
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Marriner S. Eccles, 1935 
Eccles recognized, as did Schumpeter, Marx, and Keynes, the instability of the 
unfettered capitalist system: "If there is one thing [that] seems clear it is that unless 
conscious effort is made to prevent them, booms and collapses will continue to occur 
in capitalistic democracies," he observed in 1935. His analysis of the business cycle 
rested on a credit limit which marked the ceiling to expansion, and a multiplier effect 
which resulted from reduced spending by overextended consumers as well as 
liquidation of bad investments which characterized the downturn. Like Keynes, 
however, Eccles did not foresee automatic recovery, since he did not subscribe to the 
view that idle funds would not be held indefinitely by individuals, banks, and 
corporations. Like Schumpeter, Eccles saw corporations as playing a role in the 
problems of capitalism, not necessarily by destroying the role of the entrepreneur (of 
which group Eccles had long been a successful member), but by holding large sums 
of unused funds during periods of recession and depression. 
Eccles, also like Schumpeter, was interested in the preservation of 
capitalism--but not for its own sake: "There is nothing sacred about the capitalist 
economic system. It is merely an economic organization which society has developed 
in its quest to satisfy its wants," he said in 1935. 
If I wish to preserve capitalism it is because I think that a 
smoothly-functioning democratic capitalistic system offers a better 
guarantee of what is generally termed the good life than does a 
capitalistic dictatorship, or socialism, or communism. 
If, then, we regard capitalism simply as a particular economic 
organization of society, our defense of, or attack on, that organization 
must be directed toward its effectiveness--its ability to satisfy in an 
adequate and equitable fashion the material needs of mankind. If it 
cannot be defended on these grounds it is doomed. The doctrine of 
divine right of kings did not save Charles the First's head nor will the 
doctrine of the sacred rights of property save capitalism. People want 
and will demand concrete and material results. Private enterprise today 
is on trial solely because it is not producing the goods it has the capacity 
to produce and because it is not providing a more equitable distribution 
of the goods it is producing.27 
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As did Schumpeter, Eccles saw danger to the preservation of democratic 
capitalism in the development of a class without a stake in the survival of the system: 
not the disenchanted intellectuals, students, or public servants of Schumpeter's 
theory, but the unemployed. He warned that 
Over twenty million people, or one-sixth of the population are being 
supported by the federal government. In addition, there are millions 
more being supported by their relatives or using up their savings. The 
important thing from the point of view of capitalism is that these people 
no longer have any stake in preserving our present economy. They have 
nothing to lose. And if this condition persists much longer, or if it 
recurs again in a few years, neither you nor I will have anything to 
lose.28 
If, and only if, the problem of unemployment could be solved, a bright future 
lay in store for capitalism. Eccles' views on the subject were summarized well in his 
1939 "Credo," which said, in part: 
If I had my choice, I would at all times have a balanced federal 
budget. The difficulty is that an unbalanced budget is not an 
independent condition created by a government decision--but a reflection 
of deep-seated unbalance in the economy . . .. A policy of adequate 
governmental outlays at a time when private enterprise is reducing its 
expenditures does not reflect a preference for an unbalanced budget. 
Experience has demonstrated that the budget cannot be balanced in 
severe depression by either increasing taxes or decreasing expenditures, 
or by doing both. I contend that the volume of governmental 
expenditures should be increased in a depression, and should be so 
planned, so timed, and so adequately scaled as to result in diminishing 
the duration of the depression. If we are to pursue such a course, then 
as prosperous conditions are restored, and as unemployment is absorbed 
by private activity, we must be prepared to bring the budget into 
balance, offsetting the dangers of a boom on the upswing as positively 
as depression has been counteracted on the downswing .... 
In my own thinking I distinguish between the social obligation of 
a free democratic society and the economic guidance and regulation that 
would lead to the greatest common good. It seems to me to be a 
function of democratic government to enforce minimum standards of 
decency, within the limits of the nation's resources, in all fields of 
activity. A rich country like ours can afford to insist on a minimum 
income for its families; a minimum age for schooling and employment; 
a maximum age for retirement; decent and safe conditions of work; 
increasing benefits for labor as productivity increases; adequate 
protection and security for the aged and unemployed; and adequate 
educational, health, and recreational facilities. Standards of honesty 
and decency can well be set by government--resulting in a gradual 
advance in the standards of conduct to be enforced in the final analysis 
by the business community itself .... 
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But, Eccles concluded, "unless the nation can provide itself with an adequate 
income in goods and services, the effort to enforce minimum standards of decency will 
be a losing fight. It 
"Our major economic concern is now and at all times to assure employment. ,,29 
''You have got to take care of the unemployed," Eccles had told the Finance 
Committee, "or you are going to have a revolution in this country." 
IV. Influences 
... My own viewpoint has sometimes been erroneously identified with 
that of Mr. Keynes, doubtless to his embarrassment . ... 
Marriner S. Eccles, 1939 
Until comparatively recently, I had never met Keynes, nor had I 
ever, so far as I can recall, read or studied any of his works. We came 
out at about the same place in economic thought and policy by very 
different roads. 
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Marriner S. Eccles, 1942 
I know of no professors whose writings have influenced me. 
Marriner S. Eccles, 1949 
Eccles' contention that he had arrived at his economic philosophy without 
having read or studied the works of John Maynard Keynes is accepted both by his 
biographers and by his contemporaries. Sidney Hyman, author of the most recent 
and complete biography of Eccles, simply reiterates Eccles' own account, as does Dean 
May.30 Herbert Stein, in The Fiscal Revolution in America states that "Eccles had 
not then, in the early 1930s, read anything by Keynes and never in his life read very 
much by him ... 31 This opinion is also held by economists who knew and worked with 
Eccles, such as Lauchlin Currie, Richard A. Musgrave, and John Kenneth Galbraith. 
According to Milton Friedman, "Eccles was not influenced by Keynes or Keynes by 
Eccles .... However, Eccles came to Washington with already fairly fully developed 
ideas that would later be described as Keynesian in character ... 32 
Though Eccles no doubt had forgotten by 1942, he had in fact read something 
by Keynes in the early 1930s. In a 1933 speech, Eccles quoted Keynes on the 
difficulty of gaining public acceptance of deficit spending except in time of war.33 
This apparently limited exposure of Eccles to the writing of Keynes, coming as it did 
after Eccles' own thinking on macroeconomics had matured, does no appreciable 
damage to his claim of originality and independence. Nor does the fact that Eccles 
met Keynes and corresponded with him at least as early as 1941, rather than 1943, 
as is commonly believed.34 If Eccles was not influenced by Keynes' early writings, 
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he was equally unaffected by his later works. Lauchlin Currie, who was Eccles' first 
and most important economic advisor, recalls that "(Eccles) never read Keynes' 
General Theory, and he accepted the Keynesian arguments, when I summarized them 
(in a written review prepared for Eccles in November 1936), as a matter of course. 
Nothing new! ,,35 
While no serious student of the development of macroeconomic policy has 
claimed that Eccles' views were derived from Keynes, other influences have been 
suggested. First, as Eccles hiII~.self writes, he found in the writings of Foster and 
Catchings an analysis and a suggested cure for the depression which corresponded 
to his own thinking. How much of Eccles' philosophy can be attributed to this 
exposure is problematic. As ·Currie observes, "The only thing I remember wa!5 
(Eccles) telling me once that he had been influenced by Foster and Catchings' book, 
but whether because they convinced him or because they agreed with him, I do not 
now recall. ,,36 
Evsey Domar, who worked under Eccles at the Fed during the War, recalls that 
Eccles never came to the Federal Reserve Seminar, which began in 1943 or 1944, 
with Keynes ;being the first speaker. "Somehow," Domar writes, "I have the 
impression that he did not care much for academic economists. ,,37 Domar is 
undoubtedly correct. In answer to a 1949 inquiry as to the source of his thinking, 
Eccles said, ItI know of no professors whose writings have influenced me." He 
allowed, however, that eight individuals with whom Eccles worked at the Fed might 
"have possibly had some influence on my thinking. ,,38 Among those eight were some, 
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such as Lauchlin Currie, Alvin Hansen, and Richard Musgrave who had been and/or 
would be "professors." Their influence on Eccles apparently came only through the 
working relationship, not through their "academic" writings. Even an active 
involvement in practical problems of monetary and fiscal policy, however, was not 
always sufficient to remove the taint of academics in Eccles' assessments. Richard 
Musgrave recalls an occasion on which his attempt to defend Sproul's understanding 
of economic principles to Eccles on the basis of Sproul's previous experience as a 
professor of economics provoked the Fed Chairman's scorn.39 Musgrave concludes 
that "economists undoubtedly influenced (Eccles') thinking, even though he denied 
this. His discussion of public debt in particular strongly reflects (Alvin) Hansen's 
position. ,,40 To what extent Eccles was influenced by academic economists, and vice 
versa, is problematic. According to Milton Friedman, "the academic world was not 
influenced by Eccles. ,,41 The academic world, however, was certainly aware of Eccles' 
analysis and policy recommendations, as is indicated by his correspondence with 
many prominent economists. Irving Fisher, then Professor Emeritus at Yale, was one 
with whom Eccles had correspondence on several occasions. Although Fisher had 
written a very favorable three-part essay on Eccles' views in 1935,42 Eccles did not 
always agree with Fisher's, views. In 1938, for example, Eccles, in a draft reply for 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt's signature, pointed out the flaws in a plan which was 
being strongly urged on the President by Professor Fisher to bring about economic 
recovery by monetizing the float. In submitting the draft, Eccles commented on such 
plans pressed on the President, and concluded, "I am returning also, with a suggested 
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reply as you requested, the correspondence from Professor Irving Fisher, who is much 
more intelligent but certainly misled on this point.,,43 "Ifhe felt he was right," recalls 
Currie, "he was not in the slightest impressed by 'authority' to the contrary. ,,44 This 
characteristic was evident in his belief, contrary to the opinions and advice of his 
economists, that the war would be followed by inflation, not deflation. 
Quite aside from any influences from economists to which Eccles might have 
been subjected during the early 1930s or later, the fact remains that he came to a 
view of the workings of the macroeconomy which was practically unthinkable for one 
from his background. Eccles, in conversation with Herbert Stein, offered two reasons 
for arriving at unorthodox conclusions when others with his background did not. 
First, being a country banker, Eccles saw the impact of the financial crisis earlier and 
more forcefully than did big-city bankers. Second, because he had never attended 
college, he had no orthodox economic theory to unlearn.45 While appealing, this 
explanation, as Alan Sweezy points out, would not stand up to statistical scrutiny, 
as there must have been hundreds of other country bankers equally lacking in 
college-level education, none of whom came to Eccles' conclusions.46 While the factors 
he mentions fnight have been important, perhaps even "necessary," they obviously 
were not sufficient to explain the transformation in Eccles' thinking. Lauchlin Currie 
has suggested that the key insight in the transformation--one which many 
establishment economists failed to gain--was Eccles' discovery of the fallacy of 
composition. "Our basic agreement," Currie writes, "came from the fact that he early 
in the Depression sensed the Fallacy ofComposition--of applying accounting concepts 
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appropriate to an individual to the whole community . . . . So far as I know Marriner 
had worked this out for himself .... Certainly he was the first prominent banker 
or businessman who publicly adopted and explained the difference between private 
and public accounting concepts as applied to income statements. tt47 While Currie 
identifies the key insight, he does not have a causal explanation for Eccles' obtaining 
of it. "On ... the explanation for the advanced nature of his analysis, It Currie 
concludes, ttl can only suggest that he was what in biology is called a mutation! 1148 
Sweezy provides a more concrete explanation: "The explanation ... is that Eccles 
combined unusual ability to cut through to the essentials of an economic argument 
with the intellectual independence and courage to say publicly exactly what he 
thought. ,,49 
There has been a suggestion that Eccles' Mormon background might have 
preconditioned him to see a role for government in overall economic planning and 
stabilization. The history of strong central direction and control characteristic of 
Mormon economic policy throughout the last half of the nineteenth century, and the 
combination of self-reliance and cooperation ("Jacksonian Cooperation tt ) which marked 
Mormon socioeconomic institutions throughout the history of the church might have 
allowed Eccles to see possibilities of superimposing overt government macroeconomic 
stabilization policy on a framework of individualistic private enterprise in ways which 
would have (and did!) seemed contradictory to bankers, businessmen, and 
industrialists from more orthodox backgrounds. This is the explanation strongly 
favored by Dean May and Jonathan Hughes.50 
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Whatever the explanation or explanations for the evolution of Marriner Eccles' 
ideas on macroeconomic theory and policy--and undoubtedly many factors were 
involved, his was a remarkable intellectual accomplishment, placing him among the 
earliest of the American precursors of Keynes. More importantly, Eccles, convinced 
of the correctness of the principles he espoused, became the leading economic 
spokesman of the Roosevelt Administration and the most important figure in the 
introduction of modern macroeconomic stabilization policies in the United States. 
Richard A. Musgrave, who was Eccles' personal assistant from 1944 to 1948, 
considers Eccles as "a great figure in a crucial period of our history ... an 
extraordinary figure, with a great deal of insight and courage." "It is easy," writes 
Musgrave, "for an academic to belittle theoretical qualities in a man of action such 
as Eccles; yet which academic, other than Keynes, was as important in implementing 
a modern view of macro policy into actual policy measures?,,51 Milton Friedman 
would go further. ttl believe [Eccles] played a far greater role in the development of 
what came later to be called Keynesian policies," he states, "than did Keynes or any 
of his disciples. ,,52 
In 1951,., Marriner Eccles made his last stand in Washington. Making public 
the duplicity of the Treasury Department and President Truman in attempting to 
transfer control of monetary policy from the Federal Reserve to the Treasury, Eccles 
won his most famous victory. It was for this success in rescuing the independence 
of the Fed from the executive branch of government that Eccles is primarily 
remembered. When he retired from active public service later that year, Eccles left 
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Washington frustrated with the slowness of policy-makers to recognize the compelling 
economic logic of compensatory finance. It had taken until 1938 to convince F.D.R. 
of the efficacy of countercyclical stabilization policies. There seemed to be little 
indication that Congress would be willing to pass contractionary fiscal legislation 
necessary to combat postwar inflation. For the next quarter century, while Eccles 
successfully directed his considerable abilities to the economic development of the 
Intermountain West, he continued to speak out forcefully on domestic and foreign 
affairs, always with the careful analysis, clear logic, and command of facts that had 
characterized his Washington years. 
Jonathan Hughes, the well-known economic historian, in his seminal book on 
entrepreneurship in American economic history, The Vital Few, uses Eccles as an 
example of entrepreneurship in the public sector. Hughes, himself a Utah native, 
concludes his assessment of Eccles this way: 
So who was Marriner Eccles? He was an example of the very best 
this country could ever produce. We never got the benefits of his life 
and abilities that were possible. But that's the way we are. We soldier 
on in our bumbling way, a democracy, good and bad, wise and foolish. 
As the saying goes, "Every dog has his day," and since we are a lucky 
country, once in a while a Marriner Eccles comes along. 
Fpr the memory of Eccles one has a warm feeling, knowing what 
his standards were, and that he lived and died facing them: 
The World has need of willing men, 
Who wear the worker's seal; 
Come, help the good work move along; 
Put your shoulder to the wheel. 
The music of a Utah childhood, long ago. 53 
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Marriner Eccles was a paradox: a developer of economic theory who expressed 
an intense dislike of "theory" and categor~cally denied being an economist; a 
self-styled "conservative Republican businessman-banker" who served a Democratic 
President and delighted in pointing out logical inconsistencies and backwardness in 
the thinking and statements of bankers and businessmen; and a defender of the 
advantages of a free-enterprise market economy who believed that only significant 
government intervention in the economy could save the system. 
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